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More than 200 years after its rst publication, the Malthusian thesis is
still much debated, albeit in a modied form. Rather than predicting a global
catastrophe, most neo-Malthusians stress the local character of the relationship
between population pressure, natural resource scarcity, and conict as well as its
dependency on the socio-political and economic context. This softened version
of Malthusthesis has received little empirical support in cross-country studies.
In contrast, a number of sub-national analyses have provided some evidence for
local conditional Malthusian catastrophes, although "catastrophe" is a big word
since these studies have largely focused on low-intensity violence. This article
adds to the small body of sub-national studies, but focuses on a high-intensity
conict, the Rwandan genocide. In particular, it provides a meso-level analysis of
the relation between population pressure and the intensity of violence measured
by the death toll among the Tutsi across 1,294 small administrative units. The
results indicate that the death toll was signicantly higher in localities with both
high population density and little opportunity for young men to acquire land. On
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the one hand, this nding can be interpreted as support for the neo-Malthusian
thesis. On the other hand, it is possible that another mechanism played, i.e. in
densely populated areas it may have been relatively easy for the elite to mobi-
lize the population, because of dependency relations through the land and labor
market. Alternatively, in densely populated areas, there may have been more
lootable assets, and the violence may have been opportunistic rather than driven
by need or by fear.
Introduction
The power of population is so superior to the power of the earth to produce subsistence
for man that premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race. The vices
of mankind are active and able ministers of depopulation. They are the precursors in the
great army of destruction, and often nish the dreadful work... (Malthus, 1798: 13). The
idea of Thomas Malthus that population is checked by famine, disease, or war in order to
keep the per capita food production above the subsistence level was hugely inuential and
controversial even at the time of its rst publication, receiving praise from John Stuart Mill
and erce criticism from David Ricardo, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels. By the end of
the 19th century, when the Industrial Revolution and the transformation of agriculture that
it had brought about allowed rapid population growth to go hand-in-hand with increases
in food production per capita, the facts seemed to prove Malthus wrong and, for a while,
he was perceived by many as a failed prophet of doom. However, for at least two reasons,
Malthuss Essay on the Principle of Populationcontinues to fuel scholarly debate today.
First, the industrial revolution was largely based on cheap, readily available energy con-
tained in coal and later in other fossil fuels. As these non-renewable resources are shrinking,
the question emerges as to how the current food-production system can continue to satisfy
growing demand. Moreover, the burning of fossil fuels has raised environmental concerns,
with climate scientists warning of global warming and its adverse e¤ects on food production.
Joined with other forms of environmental degradation and the population explosion in the
Third World, these observations have led to renewed claims about the end of prosperity by a
number of Neo-Malthusians, who predict that rapid population growth in combination with
environmental degradation will lead to widespread hunger and armed conict (e.g., Ehrlich,
1969; Kaplan, 1994). Much as in the case of Malthus, this doomsday scenario is heavily
criticized, most prominently by the resource optimistsor cornucopians, who argue that
resource scarcity is largely exaggerated and that, if it occurs, scarcity can be dealt with by
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market pricing and innovation (Simon, 1981; Lomborg, 2001; Matthew, 2002).
Second, although the industrial revolution unleashed the greatest increase in food pro-
duction ever seen, enabling the population to increase sevenfold since Malthuss day, hunger,
famine, and malnutrition are with us still. This observation has fed the idea that, rather than
a global Malthusian catastrophe, the world may experience local catastrophes if local market
and non-market institutions fail to enable households to meet their subsistence requirements
and cannot resolve the tensions that may stem from this failure. The most well-known pro-
ponent of this idea is Thomas Homer-Dixon, who qualies the impact of scarcity on conict
by stressing its conditionality on the form of resource scarcity and the context in which it
occurs: the developing versus the developed world, the level of ethnic or religious fraction-
alization in society, and the absence of institutions that provide a peaceful alternative for
resolving the scarcity problem (Homer-Dixon, 1999).
Many e¤orts have been made to test this more moderate Neo-Malthusian view empirically.
Most of these e¤orts have relied on cross-country analysis and explained the onset or incidence
of armed conict in terms of country-level measures of population density, population growth,
deforestation, soil degradation, and water scarcity (e.g., Collier & Hoe­ er, 1998; Urdal, 2005;
Theisen, 2008). Overall, these studies have provided very little evidence in support of a causal
relationship between a decline in resource quantity or quality and violent conict, even when
including low-intensity conicts in the sample (using a threshold of 25 battle-related deaths
per year instead of the more conventional 1,000). The latter is done to account for the
Neo-Malthusian view that resource scarcity leads to low- rather than high-intensity internal
conicts (Homer-Dixon, 1999). A recent study by Esteban, Morelli & Rohner (2010) looks
at the other extreme by focusing on mass killings using a minimum threshold of 50,000
fatalities. Analyzing country and ethnic-group-level panel data (1960-2007), the authors do
nd that, ceteris paribus, high population density is a signicant predictor of mass killings.
The scarce empirical evidence for the neo-Malthusian hypothesis in large-N studies may
be partly due to the inability of such studies to account fully for the local nature and condi-
tionality of the tension between resource supply and demand. For example, national gures
may hide local scarcities, and unobserved country characteristics can bias the results, e.g.,
good institutions may foster both peace and population growth. Hence, scholars have started
to focus on local-level analyses. Pioneering work by Thomas Homer-Dixon has taken the case-
study approach in studying Pakistan, Mexico, Gaza, Rwanda, and South Africa. Overall the
conclusion on the basis of the case studies is that environmental scarcity causes violent
conict(Homer-Dixon, 1994:39). However, the case-study approach has been strongly crit-
3
icized for sample selection bias and its inability to determine causal relations (Gleditsch,
1998; Gleditsch & Urdal, 2002).
This criticism has triggered more rigorous quantitative analyses. First, using geo-referenced
time-series data, Raleigh & Urdal (2007) examine the relationship between resource scarcity
and conict at the level of geographical squares of 100 km100 km and nd that popula-
tion growth and density are associated with increased risk of conict, although the e¤ects of
land degradation and water scarcity are inconclusive. Second, Urdal (2008), looking at the
variation of low-intensity conict across 27 Indian states in the period from 1956 to 2002,
nds a positive link between resource scarcity and conict. Third, analyzing data for 25
Indonesian provinces for the period from 1990 to 2003, Østby et al. (2011) nd that the risk
of low-intensity conict is higher in provinces where both population growth and inequality
are high, while each of these factors is not signicant in isolation. Finally, Bundervoet (2009)
nds that communal land pressure signicantly increased the probability of being killed in
the 1993 wave of violence in Burundi, a country that is similar to Rwanda in a number of
relevant characteristics, not the least rapid population growth and extreme land scarcity.
The present article adds to this small body of sub-national empirical studies by analyzing
the relationship between population pressure and mass killings in the Rwandan genocide at
the level of 1,294 small administrative units. It is similar to Bundervoet (2009) in its focus
on mass killings in one single year rather than low-intensity conict over a number of years.
In addition, instead of explaining the onset or incidence of violence as in Raleigh & Urdal
(2007), Urdal (2008) and Østby et al. (2011), it explains the variation in the intensity
of violence, measured by the proportion of Tutsi killed across administrative units. The
following section reviews the literature on the role of population pressure and land scarcity
in the Rwandan genocide. Next, the research design is presented, including a description of
the empirical framework and the data used. The nal two sections present the results and
conclude.
Land scarcity and genocide in Rwanda
Civil war broke out in Rwanda at the end of 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF),
a rebel army consisting mostly of Tutsi exiles, started launching attacks from Uganda. These
initial attacks were followed by a two-year period of intermittent hostilities and negotiations
between the government and the RPF, which eventually led to a cease-re in July 1992 and
a power-sharing agreement. However, on April 6, 1994, the plane carrying President Juvénal
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Habyarimana of Rwanda was shot down, whereupon Rwanda descended into chaos. Within
hours, the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), the Interahamwe militia1, administrators, and
ordinary people started to kill Tutsi and moderate Hutu. Simultaneously with the onset of
genocide, the civil war between the FAR and the RPF recommenced. In the areas where
the RPF liberated the population from the genocidal regime, the RPF allegedly engaged in
reprisal killings of Hutu. Late in June 1994, the RPF took power and the massive killings
came to an end, but, until the late 1990s, insurgency and counterinsurgency operations by
the FAR and the RPF, respectively, continued in the Northwest along the Congolese border.
Although the Rwandan genocide was concentrated in a relatively short period of time,
April 1994 - June 1994, all the regions were a¤ected and the death toll among Tutsi was
staggeringly high, it being estimated at around 800,000 or approximately 75% of Rwandas
Tutsi population (e.g. Prunier, 1995; Verpoorten, 2005). According to Eck & Hultman
(2007), this gure makes the Rwandan genocide the largest example of one-sided violence in
the post-Cold War era. Many have tried to understand this massive violence from a political,
social, anthropological, cultural or economic point of view (e.g., André & Platteau, 1998; Des
Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Newbury, 1998; Olson, 1995; Prunier, 1995; Verwimp, 2005).
None of these studies fail to mention that, in the years preceding the genocide, the Rwandan
rural population was ghting an uphill battle against land scarcity and soil degradation.
In particular, on the eve of the genocide, Rwanda was Africas most densely populated
non-island nation and, due to both high fertility rates and a young population, the annual
population growth rate remained high at around 3%. Moreover, despite high population
pressure, the Rwandan population had remained overwhelmingly rural and dependent on
agriculture, with over 90% of the people relying on small-scale farming. For a number of
decades, Rwandan peasants had responded to population pressure by expanding the area
under cultivation and by intensifying agricultural production by means of evolving to a
system of near-continuous cropping and mixed cropping, intense crop maintenance, and
fertilization with manure to increase productivity. Until the mid-1980s, these responses
enabled the food production to increase at the same rate as did the population (Olson,
1995).
However, by the end of the 1980s, almost all of the marginal land had been taken up for
cultivation and many of the intensication techniques had reached their limits. For example,
1 Interahamwe literally means those who stand togetheror those who attack together. This militia was
formed by President Habyarimanas political party in 1992, when the party started giving military training
to its youth.
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because of the lack of pasture land, it became increasingly di¢ cult to keep livestock for
manure (Clay, 1996). At the same time, no signicant progress was made towards modern
agricultural intensication, leaving the use of improved seeds and fertilizer in Rwanda well
below that of the Sub-Saharan average. Consequently, not only the average farm size but
also farm productivity was drastically decreasing (Clay, 1996). Furthermore, the rural poor
and landless had few opportunities to earn income outside agriculture, partly because the few
jobs in the non-farm sector were largely monopolized by the rural elite through patronage
relationships (André & Platteau, 1998). At the same time, falling co¤ee prices in combina-
tion with a liberalization policy as part of a Structural Adjustment Program added to the
economic hardship.
The strong correlation between the timing of the genocide and the failure to maintain
per capita food production in the face of population pressure has led scholars to hypothesize
that land scarcity was an important ingredient in explaining the mass killings (e.g. Newbury,
1998; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995). This hypothesis is backed up by a large amount of
anecdotal evidence. For example, the 595-page Human Rights Watch report "Leave None
to Tell the Story" mentions the word "land" 54 times, i.e. on average almost once every 10
pages (Des Forges, 1999). Reading through the passages, the opportunity to acquire land
emerges as an important incentive for the killers:
Authorities o¤ered tangible incentives to participants. They delivered food,
drink, and other intoxicants, parts of military uniforms and small payments in
cash to hungry, jobless young men. They encouraged cultivators to pillage farm
animals, crops, and such building materials as doors, windows and roofs. Even
more important in this land-hungry society, they promised cultivators the elds
left vacant by Tutsi victims. (Des Forges, p. 10-11)
Land also emerges as a very particular asset, not only because unlike other lootable
property it is immobile and cannot be easily divided by the killers but also because of strong
de facto inheritance rights and the absence of de jure private property rights, meaning that
all the land reverted to the community and could be redistributed only after all its Tutsi
ownerswere killed or chased away:
As early as mid-April in some places, burgomasters ordered their subordinates
to prepare inventories of the property of Tutsi who had been killed or driven away.
One reason for the lists of people killed, initiated also at this time, was to identify
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which households were completely eliminated, meaning that their property was
available for redistribution, and which had some survivors, meaning the land
would be available only after further killing. (Des Forges, p. 299)
At rst sight, the anecdotal evidence suggests that land scarcity played a signicant role
in accounting for the mass killings in Rwanda. However, there is an important competing
hypothesis that is based on the drastic change in the political climate in Rwanda in the
years preceding the genocide. By 1992, the war with the RPF had considerably weakened
Habyarimanas authority and, due to pressure from both inside and outside Rwanda, he was
forced to enter a coalition with domestic opposition parties and negotiate a peace settlement
with the RPF. The Peace Agreement, signed in Arusha in August 1993, stripped many
powers from the o¢ ce of the President, transferring them to the transitional government in
which opposition parties as well as the RPF received a large number of cabinet posts.
Percival & Homer-Dixon (1995) and Olson (1995), among others, argue that, with the
prospect of having to share power, a part of the elite decided to take matters into their
own hands and carefully planned both the genocide and politicide, i.e. the killing of Tutsi,
who were perceived as RPF sympathizers, as well as moderate Hutu and Hutu of opposition
parties. Hence, although, in their account of events leading up to the genocide, Percival &
Homer-Dixon (1995: 1) acknowledge that "environmental scarcity and population growth
are critical issues in Rwanda" and that "before the recent violence, they clearly threatened
the welfare of the general population", they argue that "many factors were operating in this
conict, and environmental and population pressure had at most a limited, aggravating role."
Instead, they attribute a central role to the insecurity of the regime and the elite generated
by the civil war with the RPF and the Arusha peace accords.
I will comment in detail on this argumentation further on, but rst I turn to two studies
that provide micro-empirical analyses of the relationship between land scarcity and genocide
in Rwanda.
André & Platteau (1998) studied the impact of land scarcity on the land-tenure system
and intra-community tensions and disputes in Rwanda at the eve of the genocide. They rely
on an in-depth study of a small community in Northwest Rwanda, where, both in 1988 and
in 1993, detailed information was collected for 87 out of the 124 households living in the
community. Among other things, the authors found evidence for a drastic decrease in per
capita landholdings, increasing inequality in land endowments, a strikingly high number of
land conicts, and a lack of access to o¤-farm alternatives to help quasi-landless households
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make ends meet. In addition, it is demonstrated that young men belonging to the lower
landownership classes were postponing marriage for lack of land. For instance, between
1988 and 1993, the percentage of women and men aged 20 to 25 still living with their
parents increased from 39 to 67 and from 71 to 100 percent, respectively. Based on the
quantitative information as well as their day-to-day observations of life in the community,
the authors argue that due to extreme land scarcity, intra-community tensions - land disputes
in particular - were rising and becoming increasingly di¢ cult to settle.
After the genocide, the authors collected information about the whereabouts and expe-
riences of the individuals in their sample. Of particular importance for the purpose of the
present study is that the ndings indicate that a disproportionately large number of the
victims of the 1994 violence belonged to households with relatively large landholdings or to
households that were involved in pre-1994 land conicts. With respect to the prole of the
perpetrators, the authors report that "the most violent people tend to be young and to come
from poor, yet not the most extremely poor family backgrounds." In order to interpret these
ndings, it is important to note that the community under study included only one Tutsi.
The authors considered this ethnic homogeneity to be an advantage for their analysis of the
link between land scarcity and violence, since abstraction could be made of ethnic hatred as
a motivation for the killings.
Verwimp (2005) studied the prole of perpetrators in a sample of 402 Hutu adult males
across three Rwandan provinces. He found that those men living in a household that rented
a lot of land for cultivation relative to its own as well as the relatively well o¤with a high per-
centage of income earned o¤-farm were disproportionately represented among the genocide
perpetrators. However, neither the size of landholdings owned nor the soil quality signi-
cantly predicted the likelihood of being a genocide perpetrator, a result that is somewhat
in line with the ndings of André & Platteau (1998) that it was not the poorest who par-
ticipated most in the violence. Interpreting his ndings, Verwimp (2005) hypothesized that
the relatively high participation of the local elite can be explained by their having had the
most to defend, i.e. their privileged economic and political position, certainly in view of the
changing macro-political situation in the early 1990s. On the other hand, the quasi-landless
peasants who depended on the land-rental and labor market had something to gain but also
had to defend the little they had, which left little choice but to obey the local elite whom
they depended on for land rental and wage work.
Among the studies discussed above, Percival & Homer-Dixon (1995) most explicitly down-
scaled the causal role of land in the Rwandan genocide. The authors made three arguments
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in support of their view: (1) there is no evidence for large popular participation in the geno-
cide; (2) violence broke out rst in and around Kigali City and in the northern region before
spreading to the southern region, where the population density was highest; and (3) the
planners of the genocide belonged to the economic and political elite who arguably su¤ered
the least from the countrys scarce natural resource base.
Each of these arguments needs to be qualied. First, since the study of Percival & Homer-
Dixon (1995), there has been mounting evidence of widespread popular participation in the
genocide. For example, based on detailed eldwork in ve administrative communes and in-
depth interviews with prisoners, Strauss (1994) estimated that there were 175,000 to 210,000
perpetrators, and, in 2000, the government held 109,499 detainees on genocide charges,
while the number of accused persons not detained was 49,066 (O¢ ce of the Prosecutor,
2002). In 2005, the number of genocide suspects emerging from the information round of the
transitional justice system (Gacaca) was as high as 510,000 suspects2.
Second, one cannot draw conclusions based on a comparison between the northern and
southern regions without controlling for factors other than population density. In particular,
several political and historical factors can account for the commencement of the killings in and
around Kigali City and the Northwest rather than the most densely populated South. Most
importantly, the South was the site of the pre-colonial Tutsi kingdom that had ruled since the
15th century, whereas the North had remained dominated by Hutu kingdoms until the end of
the 19th century (Newbury, 1998). Hence, the share of Tutsi in the southern provinces was
relatively large, and the ethnic groups were inter-connected through family and friendship
relations, two factors that may explain why, despite higher population densities, resistance
against mass killings was stronger in the southern provinces.
Third, even though there is by now widespread agreement that elite security in the face of
the Arusha accords is likely to be the most important factor explaining the onset of violence
(given ample evidence that the genocide was planned and orchestrated by the Hutu elite),
elite insecurity can hardly account for the intensity of the violence, since the militia and FAR
army could not openly have killed 800,000 people in barely three months without the active
or passive support of a large part of the population. Furthermore, it can be argued that the
civil war with the RPF and the subsequent peace agreement was a proximate rather than a
root cause for elite insecurity. The RPF consisted mostly of Tutsi exiles, who ed previous
2The Gagaca data on suspects is prone to misreporting. For a detailed discussion on the Gacaca information
round, I refer to the data section of this article and the online data appendix.
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waves of violence between 1959 and 19903 and several scholars stress that these previous
violent encounters can be explained by the resentment of Hutu towards the concentration of
wealth in the hands of Tutsi. For example, Tutsi kept complete control over land use and
access to land and reserved large land areas as pasture. When they were driven away, the
vast areas that had been pasture were converted to crops, an extensication process that
contributed signicantly to rising food production (Olson, 1994; Newbury, 1998)4.
In sum, since 1994, there has been mounting evidence of widespread popular participation
in the genocide in both the North and the South, and historical facts suggest that the origin of
the RPF army is rooted in an inter-ethnic power struggle over land and other resources. This
suggests that, whereas the proximate cause for the onset of the genocide was elite insecurity,
the latter may itself have been rooted in a struggle over scarce natural resources, and, when
it comes to explaining the intensity of the violence, the root causes were likely to be ethnic
polarization (manipulated and transformed into ethnic hatred by the extremist elite), the
struggle over control of scarce resources, or both. It seems that the latter cannot be discarded
as an important factor in view of the ndings of the study of André & Platteau (1998) in
an ethnically homogenous community. On the other hand, both in André & Platteau (1998)
and Verwimp (2005), the prole of perpetrators does not coincide with that of the poorest or
most land-deprived households. This suggests that the role of land in explaining the civilian
participation in mass killings is complex and that the underlying mechanisms still remain
largely uncovered.
Research design
From this review of the anecdotal evidence and previous studies, I infer that, both at the
macro- and the micro-level, neither land scarcity nor elite insecurity were su¢ cient factors
in isolation. At the macro-level, elite insecurity put the bandwagon in motion, channeling
existing grievances towards Tutsi hatred and unleashing the underlying tension over access
to land to add to the scale and intensity of the genocide. At the micro-level, a large part
of the local elite feared losing their privileged status and therefore actively supported the
3Watson (1991) estimates that in 1959, at the time of the Hutu revolution, about 150,000 Tutsi ed the
country. Interestingly, Yanagizawa (2010: p.7) argues that it was "after it had been decided that Rwandan
refugees were to be excluded from owning land in Uganda, that the decision to invade Rwanda and to regain
the right of citizenship was taken".
4The argument can even be taken further by tracing the origins of ethnicity, which according to the now
dominant theory of ethnic origins in Rwanda, is a social construct derived from work-related activity and
ownership of land and cattle (Newbury, 1998).
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killings and could easily persuade those depending on them for access to land and wage work
to join in.
If this assessment holds true, we should nd that killings were more severe in areas where
the underlying tension over land was highest and where many depended on the local elite for
access to land. This cannot be directly tested because of the lack of detailed data on land
conicts, land tenure, and land inequality, but it is plausible to assume that these features
were more prevalent in areas with high population density, high population growth, or both,
as well as the areas where landlessness was prevalent (among the young generation). The
testable hypotheses therefore are:
H1: The genocide intensity was greater in localities with higher population den-
sities
H2: The genocide intensity was greater in localities with higher population
growth
H3: The genocide intensity was greater in localities where a large proportion of
young men were single (for lack of su¢ cient land to marry).
Regarding H1 and H2, it is important to note that, in 1994, localities with high population
density were not necessarily those with high population growth. In fact, it is documented that
population pressure in the most densely populated rural areas led to demographic responses
of the a¤ected population, including lower fertility rates and migration towards less densely
populated areas (Olson, 1994). In addition, communities with similar degrees of population
density and population growth may still di¤er with respect to landlessness among young men
because of distributional issues. Hence, apart from including the explanatory variables of
interest in isolation, they will be included jointly as well as in interaction.
A nal note to make is that, besides the decimination of Tutsi, other forms of violence
took place in Rwanda. However, since lack of documentation on these forms of violence
constraints their measurement, the empirical analysis in this article focuses on the killings
of Tutsi, which may lead to an underestimation of the impact of population pressure on
violence (provided that the genocide on Tutsi is positively correlated with other forms of
violence, e.g. revenge killings, killings of moderate Hutu, etc.).
Empirical framework
Although small in geographical size, Rwanda has a very diverse ecosystem with many dif-
ferent micro-climates. In addition, in many areas, one nds hills with steep slopes where
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population density and intensied cultivation have led to severe erosion. Hence, one of the
main challenges in the empirical framework is to control for subnational di¤erences in cli-
mate, soil type and soil degradation. In the main specication, I estimate the empirical
relation between population pressure and mass killings at the level of the smallest codied
administrative unit, i.e. for 1,294 rural administrative sectors, which have a mean size of 13.5
km2 and counted on average 4,824 inhabitants in 19915. In order to reduce the inuence
from unobserved heterogeneity in soil and climate, I add xed e¤ects for each of the 137
Rwandan rural communes included, which is one administrative unit above the sector, with
a mean size of 135.5 km2 and on average 48,681 inhabitants in 1991.
The estimated model can be written as follows:
genocide_toll1994;ic = 0 + 1pressure1991;ic + controlsic0 + c + "ic; (1)
with genocide_toll1994;ic the death toll among Tutsi in sector i : 1:::1294, located in com-
mune c : 1:::137, pressure1991;ic pre-genocide population density in sector i; and controlsic
including the 1991 sector-level population size as well as the distance of a sector to the near-
est provincial capital city and main road. The latter two variables are included to capture
the variation in access to non-farm work, which is likely to be higher close to roads and
urban centers, but it may also account for the genocidal campaign having been orchestrated
by the central and local administration. Finally, c are commune xed e¤ects and "ic are
idiosyncratic errors.
In the second specication, I replace the commune xed e¤ects by province xed e¤ects,
p in order to run the test with pressure1991;ic measured as commune-level population growth
and marriage delay, two measures for which sector-level data is not available. The second
model can be specied as follows:




0 + p + "
0
ic, (2)
with pressure1991;ic now equaling the 1991 sector-level population density, the 1978-91
commune-level population growth, the 1991 commune-level proportion of young single men
(age 20-35), or a combination of these variables. To account for inter-commune variation,
5These are my own calculations from the 1991 population census. At the time of the genocide, Rwanda
was divided into 10 prefectures, 145 communes, 1,565 sectors, and more than 9,000 cells, but the cells were
not codied. In this article, I restrict the sample to rural sectors because of the focus on the scarcity of
agricultural land.
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controlsic now also includes the proportion of Tutsi in a commune as well as all or a subset of
the following variables: (1) the 1991 commune-level infant mortality to control for baseline
wealth, (2) the 1991 commune-level proportion of young men that have little education to
further reduce heterogeneity and because a large pool of poorly educated young men has been
associated with armed conict in the literature (e.g. Collier & Hoe­ er, 1998), and (3) the
percentage of inter-ethnic marriage in the population to account for the inter-connectedness
between Hutu and Tutsi.
Note that the proportion of Tutsi in a commune and the percentage of inter-ethnic mar-
riage in the population also account for possible measurement error in the genocide death
toll, which is explained below and in detail in the online appendix. However, these control
variables are not crucial as the results remain similar when excluding them.
The dependent variable
The outcome variable genocide_toll1994;ic proxies the death toll among Tutsi in a sector. It
is calculated based on information about the pre-genocide Tutsi population, the surviving
Tutsi population and the natural death rate. Using this information, the sector-level estimate
of the number of Tutsi killed in proportion to the 1994 Tutsi population can be specied as
follows:




with genocide_survivorsi2005 being the sector-level number of genocide survivors alive in
2005 taken from the Gacaca - the transitional justice system in Rwanda (Government of
Rwanda, 2005); dn a national level estimate of the natural death rate between 1994 and
2005 based on the 2000 DHS (Timaeus & Jasseh, 2004); and Tutsi_populationi1994 an
estimate of the pre-genocide sector-level Tutsi population derived from the 1991 population
census (Government of Rwanda, 1991; Minnesota Population Center, 2010.)6.
The variable genocide_toll1994;ic is subject to several sources of measurement error. In
the online appendix, I give a detailed discussion of the possible causes and consequences of
measurement error. In summary, the sources of error include the following: (i) dn is a national





 share_Tutsic1991 with popi1991 the
1991 sector level total population, pop_growthc1978 1991 the 1978-91 commune level annual population growth
rate, and share_Tutsic1991 the 1991 commune level proportion of Tutsi.
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national variation in post-genocide death rates; (ii) genocide_survivorsi2005 may include
Hutu widows who were married to Tutsi; and (iii) the accuracy of Tutsi_populationi1994
hinges on the reliability of the 1991 population census and the extent of unobserved within
commune variation in the population growth and the share of Tutsi in the population.
These sources of errors probably account for 96 anomalous cases (out of the 1390) for
which genocide_toll1994;ic is negative. I removed these anomalous cases from the sample in
the main results of this article, and I performed a series of robustness checks when including
them (see below). A number of the control variables included in controls0ic attenuate the
impact of possible measurement error. For example, the 1991 commune-level proportion
of inter-ethnic marriages is likely to be positively related to the number of Hutu counted
as survivors; the commune-level infant mortality rate accounts for part of the sub-national
variation in natural death rates; and the sector-level distances to the nearest road and town
may capture part of the within commune-level variation in population growth.
The calculated genocide death toll averages 63.1% across the 1,294 rural sectors (and
56.0% when the 96 sectors with anomalous values are included). When weighted by the
share of Tutsi in the population of each of the sectors, we nd a nationwide death toll of
approximately 66.6%. Furthermore, when taken into account the under-reporting of Tutsi
in the 1991 population census and repeating the calculation with a higher estimate for
Tutsi_populationi1994, I nd a nationwide death toll of 75.5% which is very close to the
estimates put forward by Prunier (1995) and Verpoorten (2005)7.
Importantly for the purpose of testing the above hypotheses, genocide_toll1994;ic exhibits
substantial variation across sectors. This is evident from the kernel density plot in Figure I,
the province level summary statistics in Table I, and the quintile map displayed in Figure
II. The map displays high values in many sectors in the North, where the genocidal regime
had its largest support base and Tutsi were a small minority. In particular, high values can
be detected in the northern and eastern areas where the Bahima and Bagogwe clans lived,
which were pastoralists and usually identied as Tutsi8. In addition, Table I and Figure
II indicate high values for the genocides death toll in sectors of Butare, Gikongoro, and
Kibuye, three provinces where the share of Tutsi in the population was historically high. In
Gitarama, another province with a relatively high share of Tutsi in the population, we nd
7As explained in the online Appendix, there is evidence for under-reporting of Tutsi of up to 40%. Both
Prunier (1995) and Verpoorten (2005), who estimate the genocides death toll at the national level using
population census data, argue that, taking this into account, the genocides death toll increases from an
estimated 500,000 to 800,000 Tutsi killed.
8 In contrast, in other parts of the country, Tutsi could not be distinguished from Hutu based on cattle
ownership, economic activities, customary practices or language (Newbury, 1998).
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very few sectors with a high death toll amongst Tutsi. This is in line with other evidence on
the genocides death toll, which indicates that resistance against the genocide was strongest
in Gitarama and an estimated 50% of Tutsi survived, whereas in the other provinces with a
high share of Tutsi in the population, the reported survival rate was no higher than 25%.9.
The explanatory variables
Population pressure is proxied on the basis of 1991 population density and 1978-91 population
growth. The former is available at the sector-level from the 1991 population census; the
latter was calculated from the 1978 and 1991 population census and is only available at the
commune level. There is no information available on land inequality at the level of these
small administrative units. Instead, landlessness is proxied by the commune-level proportion
of men aged 25-35 who are not married, which is taken from the 1991 population census.
Summary statistics for the explanatory variables are presented in Table II. The average
1991 population density in the 1,294 sectors included in the analysis is approximately 430
inhabitants/km2 while annual population growth was about 2.9% during 1978-91, and 26%
of the men aged 25-35 were still single. Figure III plots the kernel-density function of these
three explanatory variables of interest and indicates considerable variation across sectors.
It is noteworthy that the three explanatory variables of interest are interrelated. As
a result of demographic responses to population pressure, the relation between population
density and population growth is negative. In particular, from a regression of population
growth on population density, controlling for province xed e¤ects, it is found that an increase
of population density by 100 inhabitants/km2 is associated with a decrease in population
growth by 0.19 percentage points, corresponding to 6.6% of the average of 2.9% population
growth. In contrast, the relation between population density and unmarried men is positive:
an increase of population density by 100 inhabitants/km2 is associated with an increase in
the proportion of single young men by 2.5 percentage points, which corresponds to a 10%
increase of the average of 25%.
The sector-level control variables distance to nearest town and road are calculated using
numerical maps in GeoDa and average 26.7 km and 8.1 km, respectively. The commune-
level control variables, including measures for the share of Tutsi in the population, infant
9Based on detailed population data of the local administration, Verpoorten (2005) and Des Forges (1999)
estimate the Tutsi survival rate at 25% for Gikongoro and Butare. Based on a small household panel dataset,
Verwimp (2003) found that more than 50% escaped the killings in Gitarama, while in Gikongoro fewer than
15% survived. Based on data from the genocide-survivor organization, IBUKA, Verwimp (2006) found survival
rates as low as 15% in Kibuye.
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mortality and schooling level, are calculated on the basis of the 1991 population census data.
The sample average for the proportion of Tutsi is 7.6% (or 10.6% when correcting for under-
reporting of Tutsi in the 1991 census). The infant mortality rate was on average 55 per




Panel A of Table III presents the estimation results for Equation 1 (Models 1-4). In Model 1,
including only 1991 sector-level population density and commune xed e¤ects as explanatory
variables, the estimated coe¢ cient 1 is positive and strongly signicant, suggesting that
an increase of 100 inhabitants/km2 adds 1.2 percentage points to the genocides death toll.
When including controls for population size, distance to town and/or road in Models 2-4, the
coe¢ cient remains signicant and the estimated impact varies between 1.1 and 1.6 percentage
points. Regarding the control variables of distance to town and road, it is noteworthy that the
results indicate that killings were more severe in remote areas, a nding that goes somewhat
against the idea that the genocide was orchestrated top-down and may be explained by the
absence of non-farm work to compensate for land scarcity in these localities. In Panel B of
Table III, I repeat the estimates of Panel A, but account for spatial correlation in the error
terms, using a distance-based spatial weighting matrix. The results remain qualitatively the
same.
Table IV gives the results of several specications of Equation 2 (Models 5-11), in which
the commune xed e¤ects are replaced with province xed e¤ects and a control for the pre-
genocide share of Tutsi in the population is added. In the rst column (Model 5), population
pressure is measured again by means of sector-level 1991 population density, and we nd that
the estimate for 1 (0.015) is very similar to the estimates for 1 in Model 1. In Models 6 and
7, 1991 population density is replaced by commune-level 1978-91 population growth and the
proportion of men aged 25-35 who were still single, respectively. The estimated coe¢ cients
on these alternative measures are positive, but the former does not yield a signicant e¤ect,
while the latter is only weakly signicant, suggesting that a ten-percentage-point increase in
the proportion of single young Hutu men increases the death toll by 2.4 percentage points.
10The regression analysis was executed in STATA 10.1.
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In Models 8 and 9, population density is added as an explanatory variable jointly with one
of the alternative measures of population pressure. Only the estimated impact of population
density is signicantly positive. In Models 10-11, the interaction terms between population
density and population growth and the share of single young men, respectively, are included.
Only the latter interaction term is signicantly di¤erent from zero, while statistical signi-
cance on both of the individual variables fades and their sign even reverses. This suggests
that it is not population density as such that intensied the killings, but rather the spe-
cic combination of high population pressure and a large proportion of single young men
(~landless).
Robustness checks
In Table V, I present the same models as in Table IV but after adding three additional
commune-level control variables: infant mortality, the proportion of young men without
secondary schooling and the proportion of inter-ethnic marriages. The results remain quali-
tatively the same, except for Model 9where the coe¢ cient on the proportion of unmarried
young men is now also signicantly di¤erent from zero, be it only at the 10% level.
Table VI lists ve robustness checks for Model 5. First, population density is replaced by
its natural logarithm. Second, all 96 observations with anomalous values for the calculated
death toll are included. Third, all these anomalous observations are included but censored to
zero. Fourth, to account for possible measurement error in the genocide death toll stemming
from the inclusion of close Hutu relatives of Tutsi victims among the genocide survivors,
the share of inter-ethnic marriages is added as a control variable. Fifth, to account for the
possible impact of the RPF advancement which put an end to the genocide, I included a
variable that takes on the number of days the sector was under RPF control in the 109-day
period that the genocide took place11. Finally, Model 5 is estimated using the commune-level
calculation of the genocides death toll instead of the sector-level calculation to rule out the
results being driven by within-commune measurement errors in genocide_toll1994;ic. In all
cases, the qualitative result that greater population density leads to a higher estimated death
toll remains. The results for the proportion of unmarried young men are also robust for the
same checks (not reported).
11This variable is constructed on the basis of information provided by the genodynamics project
(www.genodynamics.com; Davenport & Stam, 2009). For example, sectors in the North close to the Ugandan
border that were already under control of the RPF by the end of April 1994 take on values between 79 and
109, while sectors that only came under control by the RPF in July, take on values between 1 and 19.
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Conclusion
The debate over the Malthusian hypothesis has shifted from a global to a local level and cen-
ters around the question on what conditions really matter. In particular, the neo-Malthusian
hypothesis states that, under certain conditions such as ethnic fractionalization and a polit-
ical deadlock, resource scarcity may be conducive to violence.
In the case of Rwanda, one may argue that the perfect storm that could lead to an unfold-
ing neo-Malthusian local disaster was present. First, since the mid-1980s, food production
per capita started to decline as almost all marginal land was being taken under cultivation
and as intensication of production had remained very limited. Second, the rural poor and
landless had few opportunities to earn income outside of agriculture. Third, the Rwandan
society had a history of violent encounters between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minor-
ity. Fourth, in the years leading up to the genocide (1990-93), sporadic attacks from Tutsi
exiles at the border with Uganda and the following power sharing arrangement led to a tense
political climate that divided the government party between radical and moderate Hutu.
The prospect of having to share power with the opposition parties and the RPF trig-
gered the genocidal campaign of the Hutu extremists, who carefully planned, prepared, and
organized the killings of both moderate Hutu and Tutsi. However, the elites genocidal plans
could only succeed with a fair amount of support, active or passive, from the general popu-
lation. Unfortunately, the Hutu radicals succeeded in obtaining such support by playing the
ethnicity card and free-riding on the underlying tensions over the extreme scarcity of land
and economic opportunities.
By how much did land intensify the genocide? Analyzing the genocides death toll across
1,294 administrative units, I found that an increase in pre-genocide population density by
100 inhabitants per km2 leads to a rise of the genocides death toll by 1 to 2 percentage
points. Furthermore, in areas where many young men remain single, which may arguably be
an indication of landlessness, fewer Tutsi survived the genocide. The estimates indicate that
a 10 percentage point increase in the share of young men that are still single, increases the
genocides death toll by approximately 2.5 percentage points. Importantly, the results of the
empirical model that includes the interaction term of population density and landlessness
suggests that these factors did not operate in isolation, but it is their combination that
contributed to the killings.
These ndings do not indicate that extreme scarcity of land resources caused the onset
of the genocidal campaign, but they clearly indicate that, once the bandwagon was set
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in motion, resources were a signicant factor in explaining the intensity of the violence.
This conclusion can be interpreted as support for the neo-Malthusian hypothesis, i.e. vices
resulting from a tension between subsistence needs and scarce resources. On the other
hand, rather than driven by need, the killers may have been driven by the opportunity
to loot or by the fear to lose the little they had, two alternative motives that may have
been especially strong in high density areas with many landless men. Thus, whereas this
meso-level analysis has provided empirical support for a local-level relation between violence
and population density, detailed individual-level analysis, based on both quantitative and




André, Catherine & Jean-Philippe Platteau (1998) Land relations under unbearable stress:
Rwanda caught in the Malthusian trap. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organiza-
tion 34(1): 1 47.
Bundervoet, Tom (2009) Livestock, land and political power: the 1993 killings in Burundi.
Journal of Peace Research 46(3): 357-376.
Clay, Dan (1996) Fighting an uphill battle: population pressure and declining land pro-
ductivity in Rwanda. MSU International Development Working Paper 58, Michigan
State University.
Collier, Paul & Anke Hoe­ er (1998) On economic causes of civil war. Oxford Economic
Papers 50(4): 563573.
Des Forges, Alison (1999) Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. New York:
Human Rights Watch.
Eck, Kristine & Lisa Hultman (2007) One-sided violence against civilians in war: insights
from new fatality data. Journal of Peace Research 44(2): 233246.
Ehrlich, Paul (1968) The Population Bomb. New York: Ballantine.
Esteban, Joan; Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner (2010) Strategic mass killings. UFAE
and IAE Working Papers 826.10 Unitat de Fonaments de lAnàlisi Econòmica (UAB)
and Institut dAnàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
Gleditsch, Nils Petter (1998) Armed conict and the environment: a critique of the litera-
ture. Journal of Peace Research 35(3): 381400.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter & Henrik Urdal (2002) Ecoviolence? Links between population
growth, environmental scarcity and violent conict in Thomas Homer-Dixons work.
Journal of International A¤airs 56(1): 283302.
Government of Rwanda (1991) Recensement général de la population et de lhabitat Rwanda.
Service National de Recensement.
Government of Rwanda (2005) Report on data collection: annexes. National Service of
Gacaca Jurisdiction.
20
Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1994) Environmental scarcities and violent conict: evidence from
cases. International Security 19(1): 540.
Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1999) Environment,Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton, NJ & Ox-
ford: Princeton University Press.
Kaplan, Robert (1994) The coming anarchy. Atlantic Monthly 273(2): 4476.
Lomborg, Bjørn (2001) The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the
World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Malthus, Thomas (1798) An Essay on the Principle of Population. Oxford Worlds Classics
reprint.
Mamdani, Mahmood (2001) When Victims Become Killers. Princeton University Press,
Princeton.
Matthew, Richard (2002) Environment, population and conict. Journal of International
A¤airs 56(1): 235254.
Minnesota Population Center (2010) Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International:
Version 6.0 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
Newbury, David (1998) Understanding genocide. African Studies Review 41(1): 7397.
O¢ ce of the Prosecutor (2002). Abantu bafungiye mu magereza kasho na burigade. Tech-
nical report Rwandan Ministry of Justice.
Olson, Jennifer (1994) Demographic responses to resource constraints in Rwanda. Rwanda
Society-Environment Project Working Paper 7 Michigan State University.
Olson, Jennifer (1995) Behind the recent tragedy in Rwanda. GeoJournal 35(2): 217222.
Østby, Gudrun; Henrik Urdal, Mohammad Z. Tadjoeddin, Mansoob Murshed & Harvard
Strand (2011) Population pressure, horizontal inequality and political violence: a dis-
aggregated study of Indonesian provinces, 19902003. Journal of Development Studies
47(3): forthcoming.
Percival, Valerie & Thomas Homer-Dixon (1995) Environmental scarcity and violent con-
ict: the case of Rwanda. Project on Environment, Population and Security (EPS).
(http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/eps/rwanda/rwanda1.htm).
21
Prunier, Gérard (1995) The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. London: Hurst &
Company.
Raleigh, Clionadh & Henrik Urdal (2007) Climate change, environmental degradation and
armed conict. Political Geography 26(6): 674694.
Simon, Julian L. (1981) The Ultimate Resource. Princeton University Press.
Strauss, Scott (2004) How many perpetrators were there in the Rwandan genocide? An
estimate. Journal of Genocide Research 6(1): 8598.
Theisen, Ole Magnus (2008) Blood and Soil? Resource scarcity and internal armed conict
revisited. Journal of Peace Research 45(6): 801818.
Timaeus, Ian & Momodou Jasseh (2004) Adult mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa: evidence
from Demographic and Health Surveys. Demography 41(4): 75772.
Urdal, Henrik (2005) People vs. Malthus: population pressure, environmental degradation,
and armed conict revisited. Journal of Peace Research 42(4): 417434.
Urdal, Henrik (2008) Population, resources, and political violence: a subnational study of
India, 1956-2002. Journal of Conict Resolution 52(4): 590617.
Verpoorten, Marijke (2005) The death toll of the Rwandan genocide: a detailed analysis
for Gikongoro Province. Population 60(4): 331368.
Verwimp, Philip (2003) Testing the double-genocide thesis for central and southern Rwanda.
Journal of Conict Resolution 47(4): 423442.
Verwimp, Philip (2005) An economic prole of peasant perpetrators of genocide: micro-level
evidence from Rwanda. Journal of Development Economics 77(2): 297 323.
Verwimp, Philip (2006) Machetes and rearms: the organization of massacres in Rwanda.
Journal of Peace Research 43(1): 522.
Watson, Catherine (1991) Exile from Rwanda. Background to an invasion. Technical
report. Washington DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees.




















Province Uncorrected Correcteda  Uncorrected Correcteda
Butare 0.15 0.21 0.69 0.78
Byumba 0.01 0.02 0.68 0.77
Cyangugu 0.10 0.14 0.59 0.70
Gikongoro 0.14 0.19 0.71 0.79
Gisenyi 0.02 0.03 0.54 0.67
Gitarama 0.07 0.10 0.46 0.61
Kibungo 0.06 0.09 0.57 0.69
Kibuye 0.12 0.16 0.78 0.84
Rural  Kigal 0.07 0.10 0.60 0.71
Ruhengeri 0.01 0.01 0.75 0.82











Variable name Description Souce Mean St.dev Min Max
Genocide death toll Sector level  estimate of % of Tutsi  kil led in 
1994
Gacaca records and 















are not yet married 1991 population census 0.26 0.10 0.07 0.49
Tutsi  population, 
1991
Commune level  % of Tutsi  in the total  
population
1991 population census 0.076 0.084 0.000 0.575
1991 population size Sector level  total  population 1991 population census 4,824 2,265 836 32,686




































1 2 3 4
Panel A: OLS estimates
1991 population densitya 0.012** 0.011** 0.012** 0.016***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)






Commune fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294
R² 0.341 0.341 0.347 0.353
Panel B: spatial error regression models by maximum likelihood
1991 population densitya 0.013** 0.013** 0.013** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) ‐0.005






Commune fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spatial  error Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294
Robust standard error between brackets; the spatial  weights  matrix used in the estimation 






5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1991 population densitya 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.027** ‐0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012)
1978‐1991 population growth 0.941 1.200 2.516*
(0.834) (0.832) (1.453)






Tutsi  population (%) 0.634*** 0.667*** 0.549*** 0.668*** 0.559*** 0.662*** 0.587***
(0.096) (0.097) (0.103) (0.098) (0.105) (0.098) (0.106)
1991 population sizeb ‐0.019 ‐0.013 ‐0.007 ‐0.026 ‐0.018 ‐0.027 ‐0.020
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
Distance to townb 0.030** 0.025* 0.036** 0.028* 0.038** 0.027* 0.033**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Distance to main roadb 0.046*** 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.044*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.051***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294
R² 0.161 0.155 0.156 0.162 0.162 0.163 0.165





5' 6' 7' 8' 9' 10' 11'
1991 population densitya 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.028** ‐0.010
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012)
1978‐1991 population growth 0.947 1.154 2.439*
(0.837) (0.834) (1.449)






Tutsi  population (%) 0.664*** 0.685*** 0.562*** 0.691*** 0.574*** 0.683*** 0.615***
(0.112) (0.111) (0.117) (0.113) (0.119) (0.113) (0.122)
1991 population sizeb ‐0.022 ‐0.013 ‐0.008 ‐0.028 ‐0.022 ‐0.029 ‐0.025
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
Distance to townb 0.027* 0.024 0.035** 0.025* 0.035** 0.025* 0.029*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Distance to main roadb 0.045*** 0.031*** 0.037*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.049***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Infant mortality rate (%) ‐0.354 ‐0.288 ‐0.312 ‐0.366 ‐0.381 ‐0.357 ‐0.404
(0.303) (0.304) (0.307) (0.302) (0.304) (0.303) (0.305)
Poorly educated youg men (%) 0.237 0.071 0.184 0.199 0.304 0.202 0.417*
(0.241) (0.238) (0.240) (0.241) (0.242) (0.241) (0.250)
Inter‐ethnic marriages  (%) 0.001 0.018 0.002 0.003 ‐0.011 ‐0.001 ‐0.016
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294
R² 0.162 0.156 0.157 0.163 0.164 0.164 0.169





















5_rob1 5_rob2 5_rob3 5_rob4 5_rob5 5_rob6
log(1991 population densitya) 0.066***
(0.021)
1991 population densitya 0.015** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.009*





Tutsi  population (%) 0.628*** 0.971*** 0.839*** 0.631*** 0.637*** 0.891***
(0.096) (0.126) (0.110) (0.102) (0.096) (0.083)
1991 population sizeb ‐0.018 0.052 0.003 ‐0.019 ‐0.021 0.028**
(0.022) (0.038) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014)
Distance to townb 0.029** 0.042** 0.035** 0.030** 0.030** 0.021**
(0.014) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010)
Distance to main roadb 0.047*** 0.066*** 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.043***
(0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009)
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1,294 1,390 1,390 1,294 1,294 137
R² 0.160 0.103 0.140 0.161 0.161 0.398
Table VI. Robustness  checks  model  5 
Robust standard error between brackets; significant at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level; aexpressed in 100 inhabitants/km²; blogged values; cthe data 
from 136 communes  are weighted with frequency weights  equal  to number of sector in each commune and the sector level  explanatory variables  are 
averaged at the commune level.
Appendix
The calculation of the genocides death toll
The sector-level number of Tutsi killed proportional to the 1994 Tutsi population can be
calculated as follows:




with genocide_survivorsi2005 the sector-level number of male and female survivors, dn the
annual post-genocide natural death rate, and Tutsi_populationi1994 the 1994 pre-genocide
sector-level Tutsi population.
In what follows, I explain each of the three components at the right hand side of this
equation in detail and discuss the possible causes and consequences of measurement error.
The number of genocide survivors
The number of sector-level genocide survivors is taken from the Gacaca, the transitional
justice system in Rwanda. In 2005, the Gacaca commenced the rst phase of its activities,
i.e. the phase of collecting information. During weekly sessions with compulsory attendance
of all community members, lists were made of suspects and survivors1. Part of the results
achieved during this phase, including the sector-level number of genocide survivors, was made
public in the course of 2007.
As Gacaca proceeded, its operation was criticized for lack of objectivity due to ma-
nipulation (Ingelaere, 2009; Longman, 2009; Pitsch, 2002; Wolters, 2005; Penal Reform
International, 2003). When reviewing the criticism, it can be concluded that the number of
survivors that was recorded by the Gacaca is likely to be more reliable than the number of
recorded suspects because in contrast to the latter there are no obvious motives for over-
or underreporting survivorship2.
1Attendance was initially voluntary, but, after problems with low attendance in the pilot phases, the law
was revised, making attendance compulsory (Longman, 2009).
2According to critics of the gacaca courts, at least three reasons may have caused over-reporting of the
accused. First, late Human Rights Watch adviser Alison Des Forges argued that the concession programme,
which requires the naming of all those who participated along with the accused in return for a lighter sentence,
led to a multiplication of names. Second, Longman (2009) claims that, over time, gacaca was undermined by
government manipulation, aiming at a conviction of the largest possible number of Hutu in order to exclude
much of the Hutu from holding public o¢ ce. Third, several sources, including the Rwandan government,
acknowledge that gacaca became a means of taking personal revenge on enemies, which contributed to the
steep rise of the number of accused as gacaca proceeded.
On the other hand, most sources evaluating gacaca also acknowledge that individuals may have escaped
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The Gacaca does not dene a legal age for testifying and there are no legal denitions
for genocide survivors. According to a former prosecutor involved in Gacaca, the survivors
recorded by the Gacaca information round are Tutsi who were living in the sector at the
time of the genocide and survived but can also include Hutu widows (or widowers) who
were married to Tutsi3. This view corresponds to the perception of Molenaar (2005) in his
in-depth study of the Gacaca process.
If, besides Tutsi, a number of Hutu are counted among the survivors, this has im-
plications for the estimation of the genocides death toll by equation I. More precisely,
genocide_toll1994;i will be biased downward if Hutu relatives are included as survivors, which
is likely to occur more in localities in which Tutsi were well integrated. In the empirical ap-
plication of the article, the possible bias stemming from this form of measurement error is
attenuated by including controls for the share of Tutsi in the population and the proportion
of inter-ethnic marriages
The pre-genocide Tutsi population
Tutsi_populationi1994 is an estimate of the 1994 sector-level Tutsi population, which is cal-
culated on the basis of 1991 sector-level total population (popi1991), the 1978-1991 commune




and the 1991 commune-level




  share_Tutsic1991 (2)
Within commune variation in pop_growthc1978 1991 and share_Tutsic1991 will cause
measurement error in Tutsi_populationi1994. Therefore, in the empirical application of the
article, I compare the results from the sector-level analysis with the results of a commune-
level analysis in which the death toll is calculated at the commune level.
The accuracy of Tutsi_populationi1994 also depends on the appropriateness of projecting
accusation due to intimidation of witnesses, including murder or attempted murder of potential gacaca wit-
nesses. In addition, the fth report of the PRI research team (Penal Reform International, 2003) in Rwanda
on the operation of gacaca makes mention of "very little participation of the population...Above all in towns
or around churches where many people were killed...making it di¢ cult to identify the culprits and to know
exactly what happened". They nd that "it is mainly the survivors who testify, while non-survivors hesitate
and when they speak of killings, these usually concern the ones carried out by people who are either in prison
or dead, or who have disappeared or ed." It is therefore expected that under-reporting of genocide suspects
is especially problematic in those areas with few survivors.
3Personal correspondence. The name of the prosecutor is withheld for condentiality reasons.
4Populationi1991 and population_growthc1978 1991 were obtained from the 1991 and 1978 population
census data provided by the Rwandan National Census Service, while share_Tutsic1991 was downloaded
from IPUMS International website (Minnesota Population Center).
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popi1991 forward to 1994 using information on population growth between 1978-1991. The
two distance measures (sector-level distance to the nearest road and the nearest town) that
are included in the empirical analysis are arguably closely related to population growth and
may account for di¤erential growth rates between 1991 and 1994.
Finally, the reliability of Tutsi_populationi1994 hinges on the reliability of the population
census data. Verpoorten (2005) provides evidence indicating that the 1991 population census
is highly reliable for total sector-level population numbers, but not for ethnicity-specic
numbers. In particular, using data for Gikongoro Province, it is shown that there was
on average 40% under-reporting of Tutsi, either by the Habyarimana regime, or by Tutsi
themselves5. In order to obtain a more accurate gure for the overall death toll, I repeat
the calculation of genocide_toll1994;i using an adjusted measure of share_Tutsic1991; i.e.
share_Tutsic1991  1:4:
Sub-national variation in the extent of under-reporting may cause bias. For example, in
areas with relatively large under-reporting of Tutsi, the calculated death toll will be biased
downward. In the empirical application of the article, such a bias may result in an erroneous
estimate of the impact of population pressure on the death toll if under-reporting is correlated
with population pressure6. However, this is unlikely to be a concern. First, for one province
(Gikongoro) for which the national census data can be compared with another data source
(the data of the local administration in which there was no under-reporting), the comparison
does not reveal that under-reporting of Tutsi varies with population density. Second, the
anomalous values (negative values) of the calculated death toll are not concentrated in high
or low density areas (see also below). Third, including or excluding a control for the share
of Tutsi in the population, leaves the results of the empirical analysis unchanged (see the
empirical section of the main article).
The natural death rate between 1994 and 2005
There are no estimates of post-genocide natural death rates among genocide survivors.
Therefore, I proxy for dn using information on adult mortality rates from the general pop-
ulation estimated from the 2000 Rwandan DHS survey (Timaeus & Jasseh, 2004). The
estimates equal 8.1 and 11.8 for women and men aged 15 to 60, respectively. Taking a
5An undetermined number of Tutsi registered as Hutu in order to avoid discrimination. In addition, the
Habyarimana regime is said to have deliberately under-reported the number of Tutsi in order to keep their
school enrolment and public employment quotas low.
6 If under-reporting is highest in areas with relatively high population pressure, then the estimated impact
of population pressure on the death toll will be biased downward and vice versa.
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weighted average with the weight for women reecting their approximate share among the
survivors recorded in the Gacaca (2/3), I obtain a proxy of 9.2 for dn.
This proxy is at the national level. Hence, genocide_toll1994;i will be biased upwards
(downwards) in localities with a relatively high (low) post-genocide natural death rate. This
bias is partly controlled for in the empirical application by including commune-level infant
mortality as a control variable.
Anomalous values and implications for the empirical analysis in the article
The genocides death toll genocide_toll1994;i includes a number of anomalous values. In
particular, it is negative for 96 administrative units (out of the 1390), which is likely to
be due to one or more of the measurement errors discussed above. Importantly for the
purpose of the analysis, the distribution of anomalous values is unrelated to population
density, which increases condence that the sources of measurement error are unrelated to
population density.
For the main results presented in the article, I restrict the sample to observations for
which genocide_toll1994;i is non-negative. In addition, as indicated above, several control
variables may act to attenuate the impact of possible measurement error in the remaining
observations, i.e. the commune level share of Tutsi in the population, the 1991 commune
level proportion of inter-ethnic marriages, the two sector-level distance measures and the
commune level infant mortality rate.
In a rst robustness check, I use the complete sample including the negative values for
genocide_toll1994;i. In a second robustness check, I use the complete sample, but censor
genocide_toll1994;i to zero. In a third robustness check, I calculate the genocide death
toll at the commune level to rule out bias stemming from within commune variation in
pop_growthc1978 1991 and share_Tutsic1991.
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